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It is axiomatic that assets which form the subject-matter of a trust do not constitute
part of the property of an insolvent available for distribution among the insolvent's
creditors. Persons responsible for administering the affairs of insolvents take the
property of the insolvent subject to equities. One such equity that must be recognised
and upheld is the interests of beneficiaries under a trust where the insolvent holds
the bare legal title. In this article the applicability of the doctrine oftrusts in the realm
of conditional payments will be considerd. If a lender lends money on condition that
it is used for a particular purpose and/or paid back out of a particular fund, or if
a purchaser pays in advance on condition that the money is used to provide something
he wants, to what extent can the lender or payer enforce the conditional agreement?1
There is something of an analogy with prepayments in sale of goods situations. It
is possible for a seller of goods to retain title to the goods notwithstanding delivery
of the goods to the buyer until the goods have been paid for or some other condition
has been fulfilled. Conditional loans or payments are usually discussed under the
rubric of the Quistclose trust and it is perhaps convenient to continue this
classification. 2
The Quistclose Trust
The locus classicus is Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd.3 This is
a case where Quistclose lent a company, Rolls Razor Ltd., some £210,000 to allow
Rolls Razor to pay a dividend it had already declared. Rolls Razor sent the money
to its bank, asking it to pay it into a separate dividend account and stating that the
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I. The link between reservation of title clauses in sales of goods and conditional loans or payments has
not always been borne in mind when one or other of the two phenomena have been examined. However,
the two are brought together in the excellent article by Goodhart and Jones, "The Infiltration of Equitable
Doctrine into English Commercial Law" (1980) 43 M.L.R. 489. For a comprehensive examination of
reservation of title clauses see McCormack, Reservation of Title (2nd. ed., 1995). See also Priestley,
"The Romalpa Trust and the Quistclose Trust" in P.O. Finn ed., Equity in Commercial Relationships
(1987); Milman and Durrant, Corporate Insolvency Law and Practice (2nd. ed., 1994), Chapter 8; M.
Bridge, (1992) 12 O.J.L.S. 333 and C.E.F. Rickett, (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 608.
2. Some would argue however that the Re Kayford Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 279 line of authorities are
not true examples of the Quistclose trust properly so called.
3. 11970]A.C. 567.
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money was to be used only to pay the dividend. But before the dividend could be
paid Rolls Razor went into voluntary liquidation, leaving Quistclose and the bank
to dispute ownership ofthe £210,000. The company's bank claimed the right to set
off the £210,000 credit against a debit balance in another account.
The claim failed. The money was held to be impressed with a trust in favour of
Quistclose should the primary purpose of the payment fail. Lord Wilberforce said
that the mutual intention of Quistclose and of Rolls Razor Ltd. and the essence of
the bargain was that the sum advanced should not become part of the assets of Rolls
Razor Ltd. but should be used exclusively for payment of a particular class of its
creditors, namely, those entitled to the dividend. This entailed the necessary
consequence that if, for any reason, the dividend could not be paid, the money was
to be returned to Quistclose. The word "only" was not capable of bearing any other
effect. 4
His Lordship was emphatic in his disavowal of the idea that a transaction giving
rise to a legal action for debt could not also create a trust. He said:
"There is surely no difficulty in recognising the co-existence in one transaction
of legal and equitable rights and remedies; when the money is advanced, the
lender acquires an equitable right to see that it is applied for the primary designated
purpose ... : when the purpose has been carried out (i.e. the debt paid) the
lender has his remedy against the borrower in debt; if the primary purpose cannot
be carried out, the question arises if a secondary purpose (i.e. repayment to
the lender) has been agreed, expressly or by implication: if it has, the remedies
of equity may be invoked to give effect to it, if it has not (and the money) is
intended to fall within the general fund of the debtor's assets) then there is the
appropriate remedy for recovery of a loan. I can appreciate no reason why the
flexible interplay of law and equity cannot let in these practical arrangements,
and other variations if desired; it would be to the discredit of both systems if
they could not."5
The early authorities
In upholding the claim put forward by Quistclose, the House of Lords followed
a long line of cases dating back to the beginning of the last century. According to
Lord Wilberforce the fact that arrangements of this character for the payment of a
person's creditors by a third person, give rise to a relationship of trust, in favour,
as a primary trust, of the creditors, and secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of
the third person, has been recognised in a series of cases over some
4. Ibid. at 580.
5. Ibid. at 581-582.
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150 years. Toovey v. Milne marks the fons et origo of this stream of authority.6
Abbott C.J. said:
"I thought at the trial, and still think, that the fair inference from the facts proved
was that this money was advanced for a specific purpose, and that being so clothed
with a specific trust, no property in it passed to the assignee of the bankrupt.
Then the purpose having failed, there is an implied stipulation that the money
shall be repaid."7
In Toovey v. Milne A advanced money to his brother-in-law, B, for the purpose
of B settling with his creditors. 8 That purpose failed and B was declared bankrupt.
What was left of the money was repaid to A by the bankrupt. The court held that
this repayment was protected and that the assignees in bankruptcy could not recover
the money so repaid.
The principle enunciated in Toovey v. Milne was applied sub silentio as it were
in Gibert v. Gonard since the case is nowhere cited.9 Gibert v. Gonard is a case
where A lent money to B for the purchase of a particular business. B in fact paid
the money into his general bank account and drew against it to the extent of several
hundred pounds for the purpose of meeting certain of his own personal liabilities
unconnected with the business to be purchased. B became bankrupt before the property
acquisition could be completed and it was held that A was entitled to follow and recover
the money in the bank account in the same manner as if it had been in terms a trust
fund. According to North J. it was very well known law that if one person makes
a payment to another for a certain purpose, and that person takes the money knowing
that it is for that purpose, he must apply it to the purpose for which it was given.
He may decline to take it if he likes but if he chooses to accept the money tendered
for a particular purpose there was a legal obligation to apply it for that purpose. 10
In other words a duty was cast upon the borrower which placed him in the position
of a trustee of the money advanced.
Re Rogers is another authority, this time of the Court of Appeal, to the same
effect. II This is a case where A, a money-lender, lent money to B to enable pressing
creditors to be paid. Some of that money was applied by B towards meeting the claim
of C, a judgment creditor. B was adjudicated bankrupt and the question arose whether
the trustee-in-bankruptcy could sue C to recover the money. The Court of Appeal
declined to answer in the affirmative. The holding was that since the advance to B
6. (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 683. See also Edwards v. Glynn (1859) 2 E. & E. 29; Giben v. Gonard (1885)
54 L.J. Ch. 439; Re Rogers (1891) 8 Morr. 243; Re Drucker [1920] 2. K.B. 237; Re Watson (1912)
107 L.T. 783; and Re Hooley [1915] 84 L.J.K.B. 181. See also the line of cases mentioned by Goode
infra. n.59 at pp. 180-181 including Re Pal/itt [1893] 1 Q.B. 455; Re Mid-Kent Fruit Factory [1896]
1 Ch. 567; Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd (No.2) [1930] Ch. 293.
7. /bid. at p. 684.
8. Ibid. The early cases are well analysed by Milieu, (1985) 101 L. Q.R. 269 at 270-274.
9. Supra. n.6
10. Ibid. at 440.
11. 'Supra. n.6.' Millett supra. n.S, at 273 describes it as the decision of a strong Court of Appeal. The
court consisted of Lindley, Bowen and Kay L.JJ.
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was for the special purpose of enabling his creditors to be paid, it was impressed
with a trust for that purpose and never became the property ofB. Lindley L.J. observed:
"I entertain no doubt that [A] could have obtained an injunction to restrain
the bankrupt from using that money for any purpose except that of paying his
pressing creditors. If this be so, the money never was the bankrupt's in any
proper sense so as to vest in his trustee as part of his general assets. "12
Kay L.J. stated:
, 'The desire and intent of [A] . . . was to prevent the bankruptcy of [B]. . . .
The true result of the evidence seems to me to be that the advance by [A] was
for this special purpose, and the money was impressed with a trust, so that [A]
could have prevented its being otherwise used. "13
As one commentator has pointed out one striking characteristic of these 19th. century
cases is the immediacy of the debtor's need for outside sources of funding. 14. The
party advancing the money is doing so on an emergency or rescue basis while the
debtor serves merely as a conduit pipe through whom the money is channelled to
the outside creditor. It can fairly be said that the debtor's possession of the money
does not mislead. Nobody is induced into further dealings with him on the basis of
a false assumption as to creditworthiness. Any benefit that might accrue to general
creditors if the conduit pipe broke down would be pure windfall. Moreover the payer
is not receiving any special premium consequent on the transaction being characterised
as a mere loan. Thus it does not seem unfair to general creditors if the payer is allowed
to return or recover the money as the case may be.
Doctrinal criticisms of Quistclose
The notion of the Quistclose trust has engendered some discussion and disquiet
insofar as the finer points of the law of trusts are concerned. IS Issues for debate
include whether the trust is properly constituted, questions of enforcement, revocability
and the identity of the beneficiary. Consideration of these questions will be postponed
until later in the article but one might legitimately inquire here about why the primary
purpose was deemed to have failed in Quistclose. Some observers have no doubts.
For instance in Re Northern Developments (Holdings) Ltd. Sir Robert Megarry V.C.
said:
"[I] n the Quistclose case, the primary purpose was clear, simple and definite,
both in its ambit and frustration. The purpose was to pay a particular debt due
to particular creditors upon a particular date; and once the company [B] had
12. Ibid. at 248.
13. Ibid. at 249.
14. See Bridge supra. n.!.
IS. See in particular Millett ·supra. n.S·, and Rickett supra. n.!.2
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decided to go into liquidation, that primary purpose plainly could never be
accomplished. Once the voluntary winding up had commenced, the dividend
could not be paid in competition with other creditors . . . and so in the
circumstances no trust for the payment of the dividend could be carried out. "16
There are some difficulties with this analysis however. 17 For a start the dividends
had actually been declared before the loan was obtained. Case-law establishes that
the declaration of a dividend by resolution of the shareholders brings into being an
immediate debt in their favour unless a later date for payment has been expressly
specified. The argument therefore is that the trust to pay the dividends was complete.
Subsequent liquidation of the company could not unravel that trust. 18 In his
exploitation Megarry V.C. relied on what is now section 74(2)(f) of the Insolvency
Act 1986 which relegates shareholder claims for unpaid dividends behind debts due
to external creditors. Clearly the statutory provision precludes debts based upon unpaid
dividends being proved in competition with the claims of outside creditors. The
legislative statement would not seem though to catch trusts of dividends. 19 As one
judge writing extra-curially put the matter: "It does not prevent a trustee from paying
trust money, which ex hypothesis does not belong to the company, to the persons
beneficially entitled thereto. "20
The better view may be that the underlying purpose behind the conditional loan
arrangements in Quistclose was not merely the payment of a dividend to shareholders
but also the preservation of the company as a going concern. 21 In other words, the
case is explicable with reference to a corporate salvage rationale.22 A similar
explanation may be prof erred in respect of Re E. V. T.R. Ltd. 23 This is a case where
the appellant, B, had the good fortune to win a big prize on the premium bonds.
He was not in the business of lending money but was persuaded to lend £60,000
to a company, EVTR Ltd., that was experiencing financial difficulties. The company
was run by a friend of his. B was advised by his accountant, in no uncertain terms,
that he would be wasting his money if he simply lent it unconditionally to the company.
What happened therefore, was that B advanced to solicitors acting for EVTR Ltd.,
16. Unreported, October 6, 1978. Despite its unreported status the case has been referred to extensively
by academic commentators and was also the subject of lengthy discussion in Carreras RaThmans Lid v.
Freeman MaThews Lid. [1985] Ch. 207.
17. See generally H.A.J. Ford and W.A. Lee, Principles afThe Law afTrusTs (1990) at p.31; Millett
'supra. n.8', at 275-276; Rickett supra. n.1.2; Oditah (1992) 108 L. Q.R. 459 at 475.
18. Millett ibid. at p. 276 argues that there is not good reason why the rights of the shareholders to the
money should be affected by the subsequent liquidation of the company, B. The desire of B's liquidator
to repay the loan to A rather than to pay the dividend is understandable though as the effect of paying
the dividend would be to substitute A, an ordinary creditor, for C, a deferred creditor, to the detriment
of the general body of creditors.
19. See Oditah, supra. n.17 at 475.
20. See Millett, supra. n.8, 269 at 276.
21. It might also be the case that there was a further condition attached to the payment to the effect that
the money should be utilised for paying dividends only if Rolls Razor obtained further finance by a named
date. On this point see [1968] Ch. 504 at 549-551.
22. See R.P. Austin, (1986) 6 O.l.L.S. 444 at 455.
23. [1987]B.C.L.C. 646.
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the sum of £60,000 "forthe sole purpose of buying new equipment". Unfortunately,
EVTR Ltd. did not have the balance necessary to buy the equipment outright and
so a more complicated scheme was embarked upon with two other companies. The
first company was the manufacturer of the equipment. EVTR Ltd. contracted with
this company for the supply of new equipment to be delivered within 7 months and
in the meantime to supply the company with temporary equipment. EVTR Ltd. also
entered into a contract with another company under which the second company agreed
to take over EVTR Ltd.'s obligations under the contract with the manufacturer by
buying the new equipment and then leasing it to EVTR Ltd. The contract involved
EVTR Ltd. paying a deposit of £60,000 plus 36 monthly instalments.
The bank who had financed EVTR Ltd. appointed receivers to the company before
the new equipment arrived and the two supplier companies returned the £60,000 less
various agreed deductions. The question arose whether the refunded sum formed
part of the general assets of EVTR Ltd. available for distribution to its secured creditors
or whether it was impressed with a trust in favour of B. This involved consideration
of the point whether the original purpose of the transaction had been accomplished.
In other words, had B been disappointed in his aim of making himself an unsecured
creditor of EVTR Ltd?24 The Court of Appeal answered in the affirmative. Dillon
L.J. suggested that the purpose of B from which any trust was to be implied was,
realistically, the purpose of EVTR Ltd, acquiring new equipment and not the purpose
of EVTR Ltd entering into an abortive contract for the lease/purchase of new
equipment. Bingham L.J. opined that it would strike most people as very hard if
B were in this situation to be confined to a claim as an unsecured creditor of the
company.25 Moreoever, it must be pointed out that B was not a trade creditor
conversant with credit risk and the bank's debenture had been granted some time
before the injection of credit by B. As one commentator perceptively observes: "The
bank would have been a windfall creditor if the Quistclose trust, and its failure of
achievement, had not been recognised. "26
Application of the conditional payment principle - some controversial cases
If the primary purpose of the payment had been carried out in Quistclose then the
result achieved is one of credit substitution.27 A, the payer, becomes a creditor of
B, the person to whom payment is made, instead ofC, the third party creditors who
are the ultimate intended recipients of the payment. Before the payment was made,
there was no pre-existing relationship of debt between A and B.
24. To borrow the felicitous expression of Michael Bridge supra. n.1 at 354.'
25. Supra. n.23 at 652. The judge added that while it was literally true that the fund which the appellant,
B, provided was applied to the stipulated purpose, the object of the payment was not achieved and that
was why the balance was repaid.
26. See Bridge supra. n.1 at 356.
27. See Priestley, supra. n.1 at p.230 who points out that the attitude of other sources of finance might
change if the credit substitution were known, but this is unlikely in the case of unsecured credit.
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Carreras Rothmans Ltd. v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd. involves an extension
of the Quistclose principle in that A stood in a relationship of debt to B prior to the
time of making the payment. 28 The plaintiff tobacco manufacturer arranged that the
defendant advertising agency would place advertisements for it in newspapers,
periodicals and by means of posters. The services of an agency were availe<i of for
this purpose so as to secure deductions on advertisement fees. The advertising agency
as principal thereby incurred debts to various media creditors. These debts it recharged
to the plaintiff along with its own fees. The plaintiff became concerned about the
solvency of the advertising agency. If the agency went into liquidation leaving media
creditors unpaid the plaintiff's reputation would suffer. Alternatively, it would have
to payoff the media creditors to avoid disruption of a major advertising campaign
that it had launched. Therefore with the agreement of the defendant, the plaintiff
paid into a special account a sum equivalent to the money due to the third party creditors.
The advertisng agency went into insolvent liquidation but before the media creditors
could be paid the liquidator froze the special account. The plaintiff, as had been feared,
was forced to discharge the sums due to the media people so as to maintain its advertising
initiative. In return it took an assignment of the debts due to the creditors. Thereupon
it sought to recoup the moneys in the special account: a claim resisted by the defendant
and its liquidator.
Peter Gibson J. acknowledged the factual differences between Quistclose and the
present case.29 In Quistclose the transaction was one of loan with no contractual
obligation on the part of the lender to make payment prior to the agreement for the
loan. In the present case there was no loan but there was an antecedent debt owed
by the plaintiff. He held, however, that this factual difference was not legally material.
The principle in all these cases is that equity fastens on the conscience of the person
who receives from another property transferred for a specific purpose only and not
therefore for the recipient's own purposes, so that such person would not be permitted
to treat the property as his own or to use it for other than the stated purpose.30
Carreras Rothmans has attracted some criticism on the score that it ignores the
possible application of the preference provision in the insolvency legislation.31
Basically the legislation invalidates acts done by a company within 6 months prior
to the commencement of winding up which have the effect of giving a creditor a
preference over other creditors and which were influenced by a desire to achieve
that result. 32. The relevant period is two years if the act is done in favour of a person
connected with the company otherwise than by reason of his being its employee.33
28. [1985] Ch. 207.
29. Ibid. at 222.
30. Ibid.
31. See Priestley, supra. n.l at 235-236.
32. Sections 238-241 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The relevant period is two years in the case of a payment
made in favour ofa person connected with the company otherwise than by reason only of being its employee.
For the definition of connected person see s.249 of the Act. Prior to the Insolvency Act reforms, the
law concerned itself only with fraudulent preferences as defined in 5.615 of the Companies Act 1985
re-enacting earlier legislation.
33. For the definition of connected person see s.249 of the 1986 Act.
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The material provisions are contained in section 238-241 of the Insolvency Act which
revamp the old law as embodied in section 615 of the Companies Act 1985 and
preceding legislation. The previous statutory dispensation nullified fraudulent
preferences and these were judicially held to cover only acts done with the dominant
intention to prefer. 34 A payment made under pressure, however, escaped invalidation
as a fraudulent preference as the element of pressure was said to remove the dominant
intention to prefer. 35 Thus the greater the pressure exerted by the debtor the greater
the likelihood that any payment to him would not be stigmatised as a fraudulent
preference. 36
The relevance of cases on the old law in the new statutory context was however
denied by Millett J. in Re MC Bacon Ltd. The new law strikes down acts that were
influenced by a desire to put a creditor in a superior position vis-a-vis other creditors.
The judge distinguished between desire and intention. Intention was objective while
desire was subjective. A person might have to choose between the lesser of two evils
withoQt desisting either. A payment could only be attacked if there was a positive
wish to improve the creditor's position. Once the requisite desire was present however
the payment would be condemned. The desire need not be the causative or decisive
factor in the transaction. Something of a discordant note was struck by Robert Wright
Q.C. in Re Beacon Leisure Ltd. 38 He said that in many cases the difference between
the objective test of intention and the subjective test of desire might be small.
How does this exegesis apply in the present context? The argument goes something
like this. Carreras Rothmans stands as authority for the proposition that the debtor
of a company may discharge the debt by paying it to the company on terms which
require the company to lay it aside and hold it on trust for payment only to creditors
of the company who have been nominated by the debtor. The argument proceeds
along the lines that the creditor negotiates away the right to receive the money
beneficially in exchange for an arrangement under which one class of its unsecured
creditors are satisfied from the sum paid. The consensual element in the payment
is said to transform it into an act done by the recipient of the payment and so attracting
the invalidating effect of the preference provisions.39 This conclusion is by no means
34. The judgment of Lord Tomlin in Peat v. Gresham Trust Ltd. [1934] A.C. 252 is to this effect and
his observations have been amplified in numerous other judicial decisions.
35. See for instance Re Eric Holmes Lid. [1965] Ch. 1052. So if a creditor is paid off in response to
a threat of legal action the intention of the company paying the debt is construed as being that of removing
the threat rather than preferring the creditor.
36. Opinions differ about whether this state of affairs has survived the new statutory regime. It may be
argued however that giving a preference to a person cannot be said to have been influenced by a desire
to put the person in a preferential position if the preference would inevitably have been given whether
or not the desire was present - in other words if there was an overwhelming reason for giving the preference
rendering all other considerations superfluous. A majority of the Cork Committee favoured the retention
of the old rule. Their contention was that a creditor who has taken active steps to obtain payment of his
own debt should in principle be allowed to retain the fruits of his diligence (Cmnd. 8558 (1982) at para. 1256).
37. [1990] B.C.L.C. 324.
38. [1991] B.C.C. 213.
39. It should be noted that Priestley's argument (supra n.l) is made in the context ofs.122 of the Australian
Bankruptcy Act which is worded differently than its U.K. counterpart.
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inevitable. If the payment is made only on condition that it is applied for a specific
purpose the recipient can hardly be said to have bargained away the right to receive
the payment without strings attached. Moreover, the "influenced by a desire to"
criterion may not be satisfied.40
There is another layer of complexity. If the primary purpose of the payment w~s
carried through in Quistclose one category of unsecured debt is substituted for another.
One unsecured creditor is paid off and another takes its place. Now to the what if.
Say a loan secured by a charge over the company's assets is made on condition that
the amount ofthe loan is used to discharge earlier unsecured indebtedness. How does
this affect the picture? Generally floating charges granted by an insolvent company
within the 12 month period prior to its liquidation are invalid except to the extent
of any fresh advance.41 Does the conditional loan count as a fresh advance?42 The
answer seems to be no at least as a general proposition, though there is some discordance
in the authorities.43. The incongruity dates from Re Matthew Ellis & Co Ltd.44 In
this case the Court of Appeal rejected the view advanced by Astbury J. in Re Hayman,
Christy & Lilly Ltd. which exempted from the fresh advance exception cash payments
made conditionally as to their mode of application. 45
Romer L.J. said:
"Where a man advances money to a company on the security of a debenture
on the terms that the money so advanced is to be applied by the company in
discharge of one of its existing liabilities or in the acquisition of some asset which
the company does not at the moment possess, the money paid by the lender did
not cease to be cash paid to the company merely by reason of the imposition
of that condition. "46
The other members of the court, Lord Hanworth M.R. and Slesser L.J. were equally
adamant about imposing the limitation that the fresh advance must not be applied
in satisfaction of an antecedent debt. Something of a via media was suggested, however,
40. It could be said that the payment has been made as a result of pressure which negates any desire to prefer.
41. The relevant provision in section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986. According to this provision a floating
charge on the company's undertaking or property created at a relevant time is invalid except to the extent
of the aggregate of - (a) the value of so much of the consideration for the creation of the charge as consists
of money paid, or goods or services supplied, to the company at the same time, or after, the creation
of the charge, (b) the value of so much of that consideration as consists of the discharge or reduction,
at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge, of any debt of the company, and (c) the amount
of such interest (if any) as is payable on the amount falling within paras. (a) or (b) in pursuance of any
agreement under which the money was so paid, the goods or services were so supplied or the debt was
discharged or reduced.
42. See generally Rajak, Company liquidations (1981) at pp. 286-287.
43. At least Kenny J. seemed to think so in the Irish case Re Daniel Murphy Ltd. [1964] I.R. 1 at 15.
44. [1933] Ch. 458.
45. [1917] 1 Ch. 283, at 285.
46. [1933] Ch. 458 at 477.
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by Lord Hanworth M.R. He said that the court had to have regard to transactions
which might often be complicated and difficult. The task was to determine whether
in substance the debenture sought to be invalidated had been issued for cash paid
to the company. 47 If it had been, then, although the money might have been used
by the company for the purpose of meeting a liability already incurred, the security
stood good.
The facts of Re Matthew Ellis & Co Ltd. , do not indicate villainy and perhaps show
why the section was given the interpretation that it was. The case concerned an insolvent
company that was granted a loan by its chairman. The latter was also a partner in
a firm which supplied the bulk of its stock of goods to the company. The chairman
considered that an advance might save the company. Before advancing the money
he was informed by his partners that they would only consent to continue to supply
the company with goods on credit if the past debt to the firm was paid. The advance
was made secured by a floating charge over the company's assets and out of this
money a substantial sum was applied in discharging the past debt to the firm. It was
held that the floating charge was good in respect of the entire sum advanced.
A more absolutionist line on the section was taken by the Northern Ireland Court
of Appeal in Revere Trust Ltd. v. Wellington Handkerchief Works Ltd. 48. Here the
Court expressed approval for the dictum that cash payments, to count as fresh advances,
must be absolute and uncontrolled.49• Andrews L.J. drew a clear distinction between
a cash payment to the company and the payment of an existing liability of the company.
The latter was not a cash payment to the company to do what it liked with as its
own moneys.50 While Revere Trust Ltd. v. Wellington Handkerchief Works Ltd.,
predates Re Matthew Ellis & Co Ltd. in point of time, it is nowhere referred to in
the latter case.
Re Matthew Ellis & Co Ltd. was considered but ultimately distinguished by Simonds
J. in Re Destone Fabrics Ltd. 51The judge suggested that the test in such cases may
well be whether the transaction is to be regarded as one intended bona fide for the
benefit of the company, or whether it is intended merely to provide certain moneys
for the benefit of certain creditors of the company to the prejudice of other creditors
of the company. 52
This test was applied by Nourse J. in Re GT Whyte & Co Ltd.53 This is a case
where a fresh secured loan was made by a wholly owned subsidiary of a secured
creditor. The judge held that as a matter of substance the new advance was intended
to secure the past indebtedness to the unsecured creditor and so the security was
invalidated. So we are left with a "substance of the transaction" test. Was the intention
47. Ibid. at 474.
48. [1931] N.J. 155.
49. Thus applying the dictum of Astbury J. in Re Hayman. Christy & Lilly Ltd. supra. n.45.
50. Supra. n.48 at 155.
51. [1951] Ch. 319.
52. Ibid. at 324-325.
53. [1983] a.c.L.c. 311. See also Re Fairway Magazines Ltd. [1993] a.c.L.c. 643.
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to provide a genuine commercial benefit for the company or merely to substitute
secured for unsecured indebtedness?
It should be noted that all these cases were decided under old legislation which
invalidated floating charges created within a certain period prior to the commencement
of winding up, except to the extent of "cash paid" to the company at the time of
the creation of the charge, and in consideration for the charge. The wording has since
been revised. The exception in s.245(2)(a) and (b) ofInsolvency Act 1986 now covers
the aggregate of:
"(a) the value of so much of the consideration for th.e creation of the charge
as consists of money paid, or goods or services supplied, to the company at
the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge,
(b) the value of so much of that consideration as consists of the discharge or
reduction, at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge, of any debt
of the company . . ."
It is submitted that the new wording and in particular, the introduction of paragraph
(b) would make no difference to the result in the cases discussed. The contention
is that the old debts are not in fact discharged as a matter of substance. 54
Failure to take account of the invalidating provisions of insolvency legislation is
also a criticism levelled at Re Kayford Ltd. 55 This case concerned a company which
carried on a mail order business. The company was in financial difficulties and took
advice on how best to protect customers. The customers were sending money to the
company in anticipation of being supplied with goods. The company was advised
by accountants to open a Customers Trust Deposit Account into which all further
sums of money sent by customers for goods not yet delivered should be paid, so
that should the company be forced into liquidation, these sums could be refunded
to the customers who had sent them. The company largely accepted that advice but
instead of opening a new account used a dormant deposit ~ccount in the company's
name.
Megarry J. held that a trust in favour of the customers had been created. The whole
object of what was done was to ensure that the moneys remained in the beneficial
ownership of those who sent them, and a trust was the obvious means of achieving
54. See Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (5th. ed .. 1992) at p.424 but compare R.E. Pennington,
Corporate Insolvency Law (1991) at pp.221-222.
55. Supra. n.2. It has been argued that Re Kayford Ltd. and its direct derivatives are not examples of
Quistclose type trusts. The contention is that in these cases recovery by the original "lenders" is by virtue
of an express trust rather than a resulting trust. For a development of this argument see Rickett supra.
n.1 at 609. In this article a broader commercial approach to conditional payments is taken and there is
no doubt that Re Kayford Ltd. at least in the way that the judge saw the facts, involves an example of
a conditional payment.
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this.56 The sender could create a trust by using appropriate words when he sends
the money or the company could do it by taking suitable steps on or before receiving
the money. If either was done the obligations in respect of the money were transformed
from contract to property, from debt to trust.
The judgment of Megarry J. is characterised by a concern for members of the
consuming public some of whom, in his words, "can ill afford to exchange their
money for a claim to a dividend in the liquidation, and all of whom are likely to
be anxious to avoid this. "57 Some might think that this concern is misguided. For
instance the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice suggested that the
customer who paid in advance for goods or services to be supplied later extends credit
just as surely as the trader who supplies in advance goods or services to be paid for
later.58 There was no essential difference. Each gave credit; and if the credit was
misplaced each should bear the loss rateably. On the other hand, prepayment customers
may not perceive themselves as providers of unsecured credit. There is much to be
said for the view of the Office of Fair Trading that prepayment customers do not
consciously become creditors, and that they have no means of securing the money
which they advance.
In Re Kayford Ltd. Megarry J. said that no question of a fraudulent preference
arose. One was concerned here not with the question of preferring creditors, but
of preventing those who pay money from becoming creditors, by making them
beneficiaries under a trust. 59
This analysis has not been universally accepted. Attention may have been diverted
from the question of who owned the moneys at the time that the company declared
itself trustee of them. If the company owned the moneys at that time, then the declaration
of trust had the effect of impermissibly altering the statutory order of priorities for
payment of creditors. 60
56. Ibid. at 282. He said that payment into a separate bank account was a useful (though by no means
conclusive indication of an intention to create a trust, but there was nothing to prevent the company from
binding itself by a trust even if these were no effective banking arrangements.
57. Ibid. at 282. The judge added: "In cases concerning the public, it seems to me that where money
in advance is paid to a company in return for the future supply of goods or services, it is an entirely
proper and honourable thing for a company to do what this company did, on skilled advice, namely,
to start to pay the money into a trust account as soon as there begin to be doubts as to the company's
ability to fulfil its obligations to deliver the goods or provide the services. I wish that, sitting in this court,
I had heard of this occurring more frequently; and I can only hope that I shall hear more of it in the future."
58. Cmnd. 8558 (1982) at para. 1052.
59. Supra. n.2 at 281. See also Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions
(1983) p.18 n.64.
60. See Waters, (1983) 21 Alberta Law Review 395 at 417. On the other hand it has been argued that
if money is received in circumstances in which the court would hold the recipient accountable as a constructive
trustee, then there will be no preference because the creation of the fund will not have put the customer
in a better position than that customer would have enjoyed in an ensuing bankruptcy or liquidation. In
other words there is no factual preference regardless of whether there was the requisite desire to produce
that effect. For this argument see Hamish Anderson, "The Treatment of Trust Assets in English Insolvency
Law" in Ewan McKendrick ed., Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (1992). The
argument is developed infra in connection with the discussion of Re Chelsea Cloisters Ltd. (1981) 41
P. & C.R. 98.
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Despite all the criticisms Re Kayford Ltd. , was followed by the Court of Appeal in
Re Chelsea Cloisters Ltd. 61 This was a case where the company which was the
underlessee of a block of flats granted numerous tenancies. It took a deposit from
individual tenants in respect of any sum which might be due from the tenant at the
end of the tenancy for damage, breakages and compensation. Initially there were
no special arrangements for dealing with the deposits of the tenants but when the
company got into financial difficulties a chartered accountant was appointed to supervise
the running of the company. This supervisor expressed a wish that the tenants' deposits
should be kept separate from other moneys of the company and so they were segregated
from the company's general assets and paid into a Tenants' Deposit Account. The
company went into liquidation and it was held that the deposits were held on trust
for the tenants.
Lord Denning said that the deposits were not impressed with a trust from the very
beginning.62 The creation of the special arrangements, however, established a trust.63
No issue of improper preference was raised.64 According to Lord Denning the
supervisor realised that the company was in a hopeless position; it had no money
to pay anybody and there was a danger that these deposits might fall into the hands
of the other creditors of the company, contrary to the justice of the case. 65 It must
be pointed out, however, that the supervisor nowhere used explicit trust language;
terminology that ought to have been familiar to a chartered accountant. The decision
has been viewed as an exercise in discretionary justice. The company had gone into
liquidation with total debts approximating to £50 million whereas the sum of the tenants'
deposits was in the region of £20,000. Greater joy would be experienced by meeting
the claims of the tenants in full rather than by spreading the piteously small sum of
money almost invisibly across the general range of creditors. 66
It has been suggested that for the company to claim beneficial ownership of the
deposit money would involve more than a taint of fraudulent trading. Under the
legislation in force at the time Re Chelsea Cloisters Ltd. , was decided, where a company
had gone into liquidation the court could direct particular payments to particular
creditors who had been defrauded. 67 In 1986 a wider notion of wrongful trading was
61. (1981)41 p. & C.R. 98. The case was approved in Re Lewis's of Leicester Ltd. [1995] BCC 514.
62. Ibid. at 101. He referred to Potters v. Loppert [1973] Ch. 399. See also Bridge L.J. at 102 and
Oliver LJ at 104 who were disinclined to express an opinion on this point.
63. Referring to Henry v. Hammond [1913] 2 K.B. 5151 and Hughes v. Stubbs (1842) 1 Hare as well
as Re Kayford Ltd. supra. n.2.
64. Hamish Anderson, supra. n.60 at p. 178 point out that the person responsible had acted in the belief
that there was an obligation to protect the deposits thereby negativing the possibility of there being an
improper preference. In Re Vautin [1900] 2 QB 325 it was held with reference to the old statutory dispensation
that a payment made under an honest and reasonable belief that there was a legally binding obligation
to pay could not be struck down as an improper preference. See also on this point Re Lewis's of Leicester
Ltd. [1995] BCC 514.
65. Supra. n.61 at 102.
66. See Bridge, supra. n.l at 357.
67. Section 332 of the Companies Act 1948 as interpreted by a majority (Lord Denning M.R. and Danckwerts
LJ.) of the Court of Appeal in Re Cyona Distributors Ltd. [1967] Ch. 889.
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introduced in the insolvency legislation68 but the concept of fraudulent trading was
retained to cover specific cases.69 In situations of both frauduent and wrongful
trading, however, payments ordered to be made only go to swell the general assets
of the company. Such payments cannot be earmarked by the court for specific creditors
who may have been defrauded.
Application of the conditional payment principle - some uncontroversial cases
Re Kayford Ltd. and Re Chelsea Cloisters Ltd. may be distinguished from Re Nanwa
Gold Mines Ltd. which seems safe from criticism.70 In Re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd.
money was advanced on the faith of a promise to keep it in a separate account, and
Harman J. held that a trust had been created. He contrasted Moseley v. Cressey's
Co. where a simple statement that application moneys would be refunded was held
not to bind moneys standing in a bank to the credit of the company, with a trust in
favour of the depositors. The intent of the promise to keep in a separate account meant
that the moneys would not be mixed with the company's moneys.n.
Many of the great cases in the company law field involve speculative projects in
far flung corners of the globe during the halcyon days of imperial expansion. 73 Such
projects often involved great risk, and to minimise the risk factor the trust arrangement
was often employed. Financiers instead of advancing money directly to the company
would advance it to intermediaries, trustees, who would release it to the company
at various stages of the project. National Bolivian Navigation Co. v. Wilson involved
such a project and arrangement. 74 This is a case where money had been subscribed
by investors for a particular purpose namely the construction of a railway linking
Brazil and Bolivia. The money was placed in the hands of trustees for the investors,
and it was the duty of the trustees to pay portions of the money over to the company
68. Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Under this provision once a director, or shadow director,
knows, or ought to have concluded, that there was no reasonable prospect that a company would avoid
going into insolvent liquidation , he must take every step with a view to minimising potential loss to company
creditors. Otherwise the person may be declared liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's
assets as the court thinks proper.
69. Ibid. section 213. This section applies to any liquidation whereas s.214 is confirmed to cases of insolvent
liquidation. Moreover, 213 covers any person who was knowingly party to the carrying on ofthe business
in a fraudulent manner whereas s. 214 is limited to directors and shadow directors.
70. [1955] 3 All E.R. 219. See also National Bolivian Navigation Co. v. Wilson (1880) 5 App. Cas.
176. Elkins v. Capital Guarantee Society (1900) 16 T.L.R. 423; Re Independent Air Travel Ltd. [1961]
I Lloyd's Rep. 604 and Smith v. Liquidator of James Birrell Ltd. 1968 S.L. T. /74
71. (1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 405.
72. Supra. n.70 at 223.
73. One might instance in this connection some of the cases on promoters like Erlanger v. New Sombrero
Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1218.
74. Supra. n.70.
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as portions of the intended railroad were constructed. The House of Lords held that
if no such railroad nor any portion of it was constructed, and its construction became
impracticable, the bondholders were entitled to demand from the trustees repayment
of what remained in their hands.75.
Another area where the Quistclose principle has been uncontroversially applied
lies in relation to employee claims for moneys in the hands of insolvent employers.
A case in point is Re Independent Air Travel Ltd. 76This is a case where a company
insured the lives of its employees, three of whom later died in an air crash. It was
a condition of employment that the company should insure the lives of the deceased
employees for the latter's benefit. The insurers in fact paid over on foot of the insurance
policies' moneys for distribution to the families of the deceased but the company
went into receivership before this task could be done. Plowman J. held that the moneys
had been received on trust for the estate of the three deceased, although no express
words of trust had been employed.
A similar result was reached in the Scottish case, Smith v. Liquidator of James
Birrell Ltd. 77This is a case where a company had paid into a special bank account
moneys received from an insurance comany representing different employee pension
and insurance schemes which the company had decided to discontinue. The sum
received was for the benefit of the employees in the employment of the company
at the date of the discontinuance of the scheme. Lord Fraser, in the Outer House
of the Court of Session, decided that this money did not form part of the general
assets of the company. The money was clearly distinguishable and capable of being
disentangled from the company's own funds, and it ought to be paid to the former
employees of the company entitled thereto. 78
Formalities for the establishment of trust
There remains to be considered the prerequisites for the creation of a valid express
trust, namely the three certainties - certainty of intention, certainty of subject-matter
and certainty of obj~cts. Moreover, if the declaration of trust relates to land, signed
written evidence must be available before the trust can be enforced.79.
Certainty of intention
This issue was discussed in Re Kayford Ltd. where Megarry J. said that a trust
can be created without using the words "trust" or "confidence" or the like. The
75. According to Lord Blackburn the trust was created by the prospectus on the faith of which the bondholders,
or those whom they represent, lent their money: ibid. at 207.
76. Supra. n.70.
77. Supra. n.70.
78. Ibid. at 175.
79. Section 53(l)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925.
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pertinent question was whether a sufficient intention to create a trust had been
manifested.80 Sufficiency of intention to create a trust was not manifested in Swiss
Bank Corporation v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. 81
The facts of the case are complicated, but the nub of the issue was whether a lender
of money, the Swiss Bank Corporation, had obtained any kind of proprietary interest
in securities which the borrower, as the lender knew, wished to use the loan to invest in.
The loan agreement did not actually cover such a proprietary interest, but in it,
the borrower did promise that it would observe all the conditions attached by the
Bank of England to its consent for the loan. These conditions included the requirements
that the loan was to be used exclusively for the purchase of certain foreign securities
(F .LB.L securities) and that the interest on, and capital of the loan were to be repaid
to the Swiss Bank Corporation out of the F.LB.L securities or the proceeds of their
sale. The borrower subsequently charged the F.LB.L securities to Lloyds Bank as
security for a guarantee given in respect of a further loan from that bank. When the
Swiss Bank Corporation sought repayment of the loan, it claimed to have a better
interest in the securities than Lloyds Bank. Although the Judge at first instance, Browne-
Wilkinson J., held in the plaintiff's favour, both the Court of Appeal and the House
of Lords held against the Swiss Bank Corporation.
None of the appellate judges in the Swiss Bank case could see anything in the loan
which specifically said that the borrowers would repay the loan out of the F .LB.L
securities, nor would they imply any such promise. Both the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords' judges were content to apply the law stated by Lord Wrenbury
in Palmer v. Carey:
••An agreement for valuable consideration that a fund shall be applied in a
particular way may found an injunction to restrain its application in another way.
But if there be nothing more, such a stipulation will not amount to an equitable
assignment. It is necessary to find further, that an obligation has been imposed
in favour of the creditor to pay the debt out of the fund. "82
The requisite certainty of intention to create a trust was also held not to have been
established in Re Multi Guarantee Co Ltd. 83 This is a case where a company, M.G.,
was incorporated to market warranties for domestic appliances, which provided
insurance after the manufacturer's guarantee expired. V was the owner of a chain
of shops and it operated the M. G. scheme by collecting premiums from its customers
and then paying them over to M. G. V became concerned as a result of press reports
that M. G. had not obtained proper insurance coverage for the scheme, and it negotiated
with M. G. so as to protect the interests of its customers by safeguarding the money
in the relevant M.G. account. To stave off proceedings for a Mareva injunction or
80. Supra. n.2 at 282.
81. [1982] A.e. 584. See also Re Multi Guarantee Co. Ltd. infra. n.83.
82. [1926] A.C. 703 at 706-707.
83. [1987] B.e.L.e. 257. See also Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (No.3) [1994]
Bee 462 where the argument based on the alleged existence of a Quistclose type trust was very much
a fall-back position and an unsuccessful one at that.
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for an order for the interim preservation of property, M. G. agreed to transfer the
money into a joint deposit account which could only be drawn on under the joint
signatures of M.G.'s and V's solicitors.
There were however no detailed terms concerning the basis on which withdrawals.
might be made from this ccount. V succeeded in arranging its own insurance cover
for the extended warranty protection, but before an agreement to release the money
in the joint deposit account to V could be effectuated, M.G. went into liquidation.
The question before the court was whether as V contended, M.G. had constituted
itself a trustee of the money in the account, and in this way divested itself of all beneficial
interest therein.
The Court of Appeal held that M.G. had never displayed a sufficient intention to
create a trust.84 The necessary certainty of intention had not been shown and thus
the premium moneys constituted part of the general assets of M.G. The problem
was that there were a number of possible destinations for the money in the joint account
apart from being returned to V. For instance it could have been paid directly to any
one or more of a number of possible insurers.
On the other hand Re Multi Guarantee Co. Ltd. was distinguished and a trust held
to have been established in Re Lewis's of Leicester Ltd. 84. This is a case where a
number of licensees occupied "shop within a shop" concessions in a department
store. The licensees included those who sold their own goods but put the takings
in the company's tills on standard terms which provided for them to receive from
the company a payment equivalent to gross takings less returns and commission. The
financial position of the company became parlous and it took steps to ensure that
further receipts of licensees' takings, mistakenly believed to be already subject to
a trust under the standard form agreements, were kept separate and identifiable in
segregated accounts. Did this mistaken assumption vitiate the intention to establish
a trust on the basis that if a person believes that he is a trustee he cannot logically
intend to create a trust for the first time. Robert Walker J. refused to accept this
prosposition. In his view there had been segregation of moneys and the incorrect
false assumption was a fortiori a reason for holding that a trust had been brought
into being.
Certainty of subject-matter
The property which is said to form the subject-matter of the alleged trust must
be identifiable. A trust claim failed on this ground in Re London Wine Co (Shippers)
Ltd. 85 This case involved a wine merchant who appropriated part of its general wine
84. See the statement by Nourse L.J. ibid. at 268.
84a. [1995] BCC514.
85. [1986] P.C.C. 121. The case was decided on November 7, 1975. See also Export Credits Guarantee
Dept. v. Turner 1981 S.L.T. 286.
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stock to a specific customer order only when the customer came to collect the wine.
The wine merchant went into receivership. Oliver J. held that customers could not
claim to be beneficiaries under a trust (of the wine) as the essential element of certainty
of subject matter was absent.
Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd. was distinguished in Hunter v Moss.85aIn this
case the defendant was the absolute beneficial owner of 950 shares in a company
which had an issued share capital of I ,000 ordinary shares. He orally declared himself
to be a trustee of these shares for the plaintiff. Was there the requisite certainty of
subject matter for the trust to be effective? The Court of Appeal answered in the
affirmative in this particular case, since all the shares were of one class in one company
and were of such a nature as to be indistinguishable from one another. They were
all equally capable of satisfying the trust. 85b
Certainty of objects
Even if the requirements of certainty of intention and certainty of subject-matter
are satisfied, there cannot be a valid rust for beneficiaries or purposes if those
beneficiaries or purposes are themselves insufficiently certain.86 In such a situation
of uncertainty the property is held on a resulting trust for the settlor. The word
"resulting" is used in the sense of "springing back".87 The beneficial interest is
said to spring back to the grantor but in reality it never left him. In Quistclose itself
the primary purpose of the payment was held to have failed so that the property was
held on a resulting trust for the grantor. 88
85a. [1994] 3 All E.R.215. See alsoRe Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1994] 2 All E.R. 806 and Re Stapylton
Fletcher Ltd. !1995] I All E.R. 192.
85b. Dillon L.J. said at 222, "Just as a person can give, by will, a specified number of his shares of
a certain class in a certain company, so equally, in my judgment, he can declare himself trustee of 50
of his ordinary shares in ... whatever the company may be, and that is effective to give a beneficial
proprietary interest to the beneficiary under the trust. "
86. Generally the only type of valid purpose trusts are charitable trusts because of the beneficiary principle,
i.e. there must be beneficiaries who can apply to the court to enforce their rights. In the case of a charitable
trust the Attorney General, as guardian of the public interest, may enforce. However, the courts have
recognised a certain anomalous category of non-charitable trusts. See generally Re Astor's Settlement
Trusts [1952] Ch. 534; Leahy v. Attorney Generalfor New South Wales [1959] A.C. 457; Re Denley's
Trust Deed [1969] I Ch. 373 and Wicks v. Firth [1983] A.C. 214.
87. "Resulting" is derived from the Latin verb resalire.
88. There has been some discussion as to the nature of this secondary trust. In the Australian High Court
case Australasian Conference Association Ltd. v. Mainline Constructions Pry. Ltd. (1979) 141 C.L.R.
335 at 353 Gibbs A.C.J. conceived of Quistclose as standing for the proposition that where money is
advanced by A to B with the mutual intention that it should not become part of the assets of B, but should
be used exclusively for a specific purpose, there will be implied, at least in the absence of a contrary
intention, a stipulation that if the purpose fails the money will be repaid. In Quistclose, on the other hand,
Lord Wilberforce seems to see the secondary trust as being based on an intention on the part of the lender.
It was submitted that the controversy is a somewhat sterile one with the differences in formulation being
more a matter of terminology than of substance.
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Enforcement rights
Controversy has dogged the Quistclose trust in relation to the right of the settlor,
recognised in the locus classicus itself, to see that the property is applied for the
primary stated purpose.89 It has been suggested that the right is not the right of a
beneficiary under the resulting trust, for if the primary purpose is fulfilled there is
no resulting trust and the payer is a mere creditor. It is axiomatic that, as a general
proposition, a grantor or settlor who retains no beneficial interest cannot enforce
the trust which he has created, but the beneficiaries can.90 This principle forms the
basis of the rule against non-charitable purpose trusts and also is at the heart of the
principle enunciated in Saunders v. Vautier.91 Under this doctrine beneficiaries of
full age and consent, who are all ascertained and between them entitled to the entire
beneficial interest in the trust property, may have the property transferred to themselves
absolutely, and bring the trust to an end.
Peter Millett Q.C., as he then was, has argued vehemently that Quistclose does
not necessitate the recognition of a new genus of enforceable purpose trust which
a settlor may enforce.92 In his opinion the question of enforceability involves an
examination of the payer's intention, which is to be gleaned from the conduct of the
parties, the language used and the circumstances of the case. Mr. Millett has suggested
various guidelines by which the payer's intention may be ascertained.93 These
guidelines were expressly adopted and applied by Hardie Boys J. speaking for the
New Zealand Court of Appeal in General Communications Ltd. v. DFC New Zealand
Ltd:94
"1. If A's intention was to benefit C, or his object would be frustrated if he
were to retain a power of revocation, the transaction will create an irrevocable
trust in favour of C, enforceable by C, but not by A. The beneficial interest
in the trust property will be in C.
2. If A's intention was to benefit B (though without vesting a beneficial interest
in him), or to benefit himself by furthering some private or commercial interest
of his own, and not (except incidentally) to benefit C, then the transaction will
89. See Heydon, Gummow and Austin, at 357; Millett, supra.n.8 at 287.
90. This principle forms the' basis of the rule against non-charitable purpose trusts and also is at the heart
of the doctrine enunciated in Saunders v. Vautier infra. 91 and text.
91. (1841) Cr. & Ph. 240.
92. Supra. n.8 particularly at p. 290. Mr. Millett is now a Judge.
93. Ibid. at 290. These guidelines were adopted and applied by Hardie Boys J. speaking for the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in General Communications Ltd v. DFC New Zealand Ltd. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R.
406. For critical comment see Rickett, supra. n.1 at 630 et seq. Other New Zealand cases include Dines
Construction Ltd. v. Perry Dines Corp Ltd. (/989) 4 N.z. C.L C. 65, and Re Securitibank Ltd. [1978]
I N.Z.L.R. 97 and more recently Lankshear v. A.N.Z. [1993] I N.Z.L.R. 481. Relevant Australian
authority includes Re Associated Securities Ltd. [1981] I N.S.W.L.R. 742; Rose v. Rose (1986) 7
N.S.W.L.R. 679; Re Groom (1977) 16 ALR 278; Re Miles (1989) 85 ALR 216.
94. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 406 at 432-433. See also Dines COllStruction Ltd. v. Perry Dines Corp. Ltd.
ibid. at p. 298. The New Zealand cases are discussed by Rickett. supra. n.1 at 630-646, and see also
J.K. Maxton, "Quistclose Developments in New Zealand" (1990) 9 Int. Banking Law 216.
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create a trust in favour of A alone, and B will hold the trust property in trust
to comply with A's directions. The trust will be enforceable by A but not by
C. The beneficial interest will remain in A.
3. Where A's object was to save B from bankruptcy by enabling him to pay
his creditors, the prima facie inference is that set out in paragraph 2 above.
Wherever that is the correct inference;
(i) Where A has an interest of his own, separate and distinct from any interest
of B, in seeing that the money is applied for the stated purpose, B will be under
a positive obligation, enforceable by A, to apply it for that purpose. Where A
has no such interest, B will be regarded as having a power, but no duty, to apply
it for the stated purpose, and A's remedy will be confined to preventing the
misapplication of the money.
(ii) Prima facie, A's directions will be regarded as revocable by him; but he
may contract with B not to revoke them without B's consent.
(iii) Communication to C of the arrangements prior to A's revocation will effect
an assignment of A's equitable interest to C, and convert A's revocable mandate
into an irrevocable trust for C.':
The New Zealand Court of Appeal entered one caveat. Millett's formulation suggested
that it was the lender's intention that was relevant, whereas in Quistclose the emphasis
was on mutual intention.95 A reconciliation was suggested on the basis that intention
had to be ascertained objectively.96 What one party was objectively seen to have
intended must, ex hypothesi, have been appreciated by the other and accepted by
him when he participated in the arrangement.
General Communications Ltd. involved in acute form, the issue of the resolution
of the following conundrum. A lender, A, lends money to B, with the latter undertaking
that the money shall be applied for the purpose of paying off his creditor, C. Is the
creditor entitled to recover what he was given to understand was intended for him,
but was not paid, having instead been reclaimed by the lender? The Court said "yes"
but only because of the peculiar circumstances of the case rather than by reason of
the adoption of any general principle. While the guidelines propounded by Mr. Millett
were clearly accepted, their manner of application is somewhat ambiguous. Stress
was laid on the fact that the arrangements had been communicated to the creditor,
C, making it clear that the latter need not rely on B alone for payment. This would
indicate a category 3(iii) case.97 On the other hand, the Court also said that as the
purpose of the arrangement would be defeated by the lender, A being able to revoke
95. Lord Wilberforce said that the mutual intention of the respondents and of Rolls Razor Ltd., and the
essence of the bargain, was that the sum advanced should not become part of the assets of Rolls Razor
Ltd. but should be used exclusively for payment of a particular class of its creditors, namely those entitled
to the dividend: see supra. n.3 at 580.
96. Supra. n.93 at 433.
97. Ibid. at 435.
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it at will, it had put the funds beyond its power of recall and had conferred a beneficial
interest on each supplier as each contract of supply was fulfilled.98 This exposition
would seem to suggest a category 1 classification.
Mr. Millett's analysis views the Quistclose trust as an example of what is sometimes
called an "illusory trust. "99 Where a valid trust has been brought into being it cannot
be revoked by the settlor unless the settlement itself contains a power of revocation.
Where a debtor conveys property for the benefit of his creditors an exception to the
principle of non-revocability is said to arise, but the true view seems to be that the
apparent beneficiaries never acquire any interest in the property at all. All we have
is a trust to comply with the settlor's directions. 100 According to one judge:
"A man who, without any communication with his creditors, puts property into
the hands of his trustees for the purpose of paying his debts, proposes only a
benefit for himself by the payment of his debts: his object is not to benefit his
creditors. "101
According to James L.J. in John v. James;
"Such a deed as this is to be construed as a mandate, the same sort of mandate
that a man gives when he gives his servant money, with directions to pay it in
a particular way: it does not create any legal or equitable right in favour of a
particular creditor. The right to the direction of the money is the right of the
person who has put the money in the hands of his agent or steward or whoever
it may be." 102
English unorthodoxy
The issue of enforceability of a Quistclose trust was considered in Carreras Rothmans
Ltd. v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd. Peter Gibson J. pointed out that in none
of the many reported cases in the Quistclose line of cases had any consideration been
given to the question, whether the person intended to benefit from the carrying out
of the specific purpose which created the trust, had enforceable rights. 103 In this case
he rejected the proposition that the third party creditors, for the payment of whose
debts the plaintiff had paid the moneys into the special account, had no enforceable
98. Ibid. The court said that there was not the intention to confer a direct and immediate benefit that
marked New Prance & Garrard's Trustee v. Hunting [1897] 2 Q.B. 19. This is a case where a trust
was established to make good to their beneficiaries breaches of other trusts by the settlor, who intended
to give them an absolute interest. Lord Esher M.R. said at p.26 that it was "obvious that it could not
be his intention to reserve to himself any right or possibility of undoing what he was doing, and that
he intended that it should be irrevocable".
99. Supra. n.8 at 288-289.
100. See generally on illusory trusts Pettit, Equity and the Law afTrusts (7th. ed. 1993)at pp. 214-215.
101. Pepys M.R. in Bill v. Cureton (1834) 2 My. & K. 503 at 511.
102. (1878) 8 Ch. D. 744 at 749-750.
103. Supra. n.28.
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rights. He also said that the doctrine of illusory trusts had no application to the facts
of the present case. 104
Copious reference was made in the case to the unreported decision of Sir Robert
Megarry V.C. in Re Northern Developments (Holdings) Ltd. lOS This is a case where
one company, Northern, was the parent company of a number of companies including
one, Kelly, that was in financial difficulties. A consortium of banks agreed to put
up a large sum of money in an attempt to rescue Kelly. This money was used to
keep Kelly alive for a time, but Kelly was then put into receivership at a time when
more than half the fund was unexpended. The Vice Chancellor held that the fund
was subject to a Quistclose type trust. This trust was enforceable by the bank as lenders,
by Kelly for whose immediate benefit the fund was established, and by Kelly's creditors.
The interests of creditors were described in the following fashion:
"The fund was established not with the object of vesting the beneficial interest
in them, but in order to confer a benefit on Kelly (and so, consequentially, on
the rest of the group and the bankers) by ensuring that Kelly's creditors would
be paid in an orderly manner. There is perhaps some parallel in the position
of a beneficiary entitled to a share of residue under a will. What he has is not
a beneficial interest in any asset forming part of residue, but a right to compel
the executor to administer the assets of the deceased properly. It seems to me
that it is that sort of right which the creditors of Kelly had."
On this interpretation the beneficial interest is in suspense until the payment is made.
Mr. Millett argues that the right result was reached in Re Northern Developments
(Holdings) Ltd. but for the wrong reasons. 106 He relies on the fact that creditors of
Kelly were aware of the existence ofthe fund and derived comfort from its existence.
It seems that creditors of Kelly who applied for payment of their debts or who expressed
concern were told of the existence, size and purpose of the fund i.e. to stave off a
liquidinion of Kelly. In Mr. Millett's view communication of the arrangements to
the creditor, followed by forebearance by the creditor, raises an equity against the
payer which prevents him from revoking the arrangements, or otherwise intercepting
payment to the creditor. Be that as it may, it is certainly not the way in which Megarry
V.C. approached the case. It is submitted that the following statement by one
commentator more truly reflects the principles expounded in the English cases on
the Quistclose trust:
104. According to Peter Gibson J. the doctrine of illusory trusts applied where a debtor for his own convenience
settled property in favour of his creditors, the court treating the trust as a revocable one. In the present
case although the defendant agreed to the discharge of an asset, its book debts, by payment by its debtor,
the plaintiff, in such a way that the moneys paid would not be held on trust to pay its creditors, the defendant
did not enter into the arrangement for its convenience but for good commercial reasons on the insistence
of the plaintiff and the trust was not for its creditors generally but for a particular class of creditor.
105. Supra. n.16.
106. Supra. n.8.
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, 'A variety of equitable rights and obligations arise in respect of the primary
purpose trust:
(i) the transferor can enforce the trust, and it is suggested, restrain any breach
of the trust on the part of the transferee;
(ii) the "direct" or "factual" beneficiaries can also enforce the trust, so as to
acquire by the transfer ofthe money or property to them an absolute title, and,
it is suggested, can also restrain any breach of the trust;
(iii) certain other 'interested parties' might be treated as having standing also
to enforce or restrain breaches, e.g. subsidiary companies where the transferee
is the parent company and the transfer was made in the context of a corporate
salvage plan.
While the primary purpose trust endures, the beneficial interest in the property
remains in suspense." 107.
Conclusion
Conditional payments made to a company that has subsequently become insolvent
should escape the clutches of the liquidator. The devices through which this result
can be achieved are discussed in this article. The Quistclose trust is one such mechanism
and the Re Kayford type trust is another. Quistclose involves a primary
purpose/secondary purpose trust whereas the Re Kayford line of authorities entail
more in the nature of an orthodox persons trust with specific and recognisable
beneficiaries, and no added complication of a secondary purpose. Here both have
been run together under the rubric of conditional payments since they serve the same
commercial purpose. Both strain at the leash of conventional trust principles. With
the Quistclose trust the difficulty lies with the application of the beneficiary concept
which is at the heart of trust law. It is submitted however that the problems may
be overcome if the relevant principles are interpreted flexibly, and bearing in mind
the overriding commercial objective of conditional payment arrangements. The
Quistclose trust is the functional equivalent of the purchase money security interest
or acquisition mortgage and should be accorded recognition and priority as such. 108.
With Re Kayford and associated cases the difficulties arise at an altogether more factual
level. Sometimes the conditional element in the payment may seem like an exercise
in ex post facto rationalisation and the decision approaches an application of
discretionary justice. If that is the case then we are more in the realm of the so-called
remedial constructive trust - but that is another story.
107.See Rickett supra. n.1 at 619. The article by Rickett also contains an interesting account of the Australian
cases Re Groom; Re Associated Securities Ltd; Rose v. Rose; and Re Miles all supra. n.93.
108. For the use of the concept of the purchase money security interest in a different context see Bennett
and Davis, (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 448.
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